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ABSTRACT
In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel
memory from user space by exploiting side-effects from transient
instructions. While this attack has been mitigated through stronger
isolation boundaries between user and kernel space, Meltdown
inspired an entirely new class of fault-driven transient execution
attacks. Particularly, over the past year, Meltdown-type attacks
have been extended to not only leak data from the L1 cache but
also from various other microarchitectural structures, including the
FPU register file and store buffer.
In this paper, we present the ZombieLoad attack which uncov-
ers a novel Meltdown-type effect in the processor’s previously
unexplored fill-buffer logic. Our analysis shows that faulting load
instructions (i.e., loads that have to be re-issued for either architec-
tural or microarchitectural reasons) may transiently dereference
unauthorized destinations previously brought into the fill buffer
by the current or a sibling logical CPU. Hence, we report data
leakage of recently loaded stale values across logical cores. We
demonstrate ZombieLoad’s effectiveness in a multitude of practical
attack scenarios across CPU privilege rings, OS processes, virtual
machines, and SGX enclaves. We discuss both short and long-term
mitigation approaches and arrive at the conclusion that disabling
hyperthreading is the only possible workaround to prevent this
extremely powerful attack on current processors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; Systems security; Operating systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Meltdown [45] was the first microarchitectural attack com-
pletely breaching the security boundary between the user and
kernel space and, thus, allowed to leak arbitrary data. While Melt-
down was fixed using a stronger isolation between user and kernel
space, the underlying principle turned out to be an entire class of
transient-execution attacks [9]. Over the past year, researchers have
demonstrated that Meltdown-type attacks cannot only leak kernel
data to user space, but also leak data across user processes, virtual
machines, and SGX enclaves [68, 75]. Furthermore, data cannot only
be leaked from the L1 cache but also from other microarchitectural
structures, including the register file [67], the line-fill buffer [45, 72],
and, as shown in concurrent work, the store buffer [53].
Instead of executing the instruction stream in order, most mod-
ern processors can re-order instructions while maintaining archi-
tectural equivalence, creating the illusion of an in-order machine.
Instructions then may already have been executed when the CPU
detects that a previous instruction raises an exception. Hence, such
instructions following the faulting instruction (i.e., transient instruc-
tions) are rolled back. While the rollback ensures that there are no
architectural effects, side effects might remain in the microarchitec-
tural state. MostMeltdown-type data leaks exploit overly aggressive
performance optimizations around out-of-order execution.
For many years, the microarchitectural state was considered in-
visible to applications, and hence security considerations were often
limited to the architectural state. Specifically, microarchitectural
elements often do not distinguish between different applications or
privilege levels [9, 14, 37, 45, 58, 61, 63].
In this paper, we show that, first, there still are unexplored mi-
croarchitectural buffers, and second, both architectural and microar-
chitectural faults can be exploited. With our notion of “microar-
chitectural faults”, i.e., faults that cause a memory request to be
re-issued internally without ever becoming architecturally visible,
we demonstrate that Meltdown-type attacks can also be triggered
without raising an architectural exception such as a page fault.
Based on this, we demonstrate ZombieLoad, a novel, extremely
powerful Meltdown-type attack targeting the fill buffer logic.
ZombieLoad exploits that load instructions which have to be
re-issued internally, may first transiently compute on stale values
belonging to previous memory operations from either the current
or a sibling hyperthread. Using established transient execution at-
tack techniques, adversaries can recover the values of such “zombie
load” operations. Importantly, in contrast to all previously known
transient execution attacks [9], ZombieLoad reveals recent data val-
ues without adhering to any explicit address-based selectors. Hence,
we consider ZombieLoad an instance of a novel type of microarchi-
tectural data sampling attacks. We present microarchitectural data
sampling as the missing link between traditional memory-based
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side-channels which correlate data adresses within a victim execu-
tion, and existing Meltdown-type transient execution attacks that
can directly recover data values belonging to an explicit address. In
this paper, we combine primitives from traditional side-channel at-
tacks with incidental data sampling in the time domain to construct
extremely powerful attacks with targeted leakage in the address
domain. This not only opens up new attack avenues, but also re-
enables attacks that were previously assumed to be mitigated.
We demonstrate ZombieLoad’s real-world implications in a mul-
titude of practical attack scenarios that leak across processes, privi-
lege boundaries, and even across logical CPU cores. Furthermore,
we show that we can leak Intel SGX enclave secrets loaded from
a sibling logical core. We demonstrate that ZombieLoad attackers
may extract sealing keys from Intel’s architectural quoting enclave,
ultimately breaking SGX’s confidentiality and remote attestation
guarantees. ZombieLoad is furthermore not limited to native code
execution, but also works across virtualization boundaries. Hence,
virtual machines can attack not only the hypervisor but also differ-
ent virtual machines running on a sibling logical core. We conclude
that disabling hyperthreading, in addition to flushing several mi-
croarchitectural states during context switches, is the only possible
workaround to prevent this extremely powerful attack.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are:
(1) We present ZombieLoad, a powerful data sampling attack
leaking data accessed on the same or sibling hyperthread.
(2) We combine incidental data sampling in the time domain
with traditional side-channel primitives to construct a tar-
geted information flow similar to regular Meltdown attacks.
(3) We demonstrate ZombieLoad in several real-world scenarios:
cross-process, cross-VM, user-to-kernel, and SGX.
(4) We show that ZombieLoad breaks the security guarantees
provided by Intel SGX.
(5) We are the first to do post-processing of the leaked data
within the transient domain to eliminate noise.
Outline. Section 2 provides background. Section 3 provides an
overview of ZombieLoad, and introduces a novel classification
scheme for memory-based side-channel attacks. Section 4 describes
attack scenarios and the respective attacker models. Section 5 in-
troduces and evaluates the basic primitives required for mounting
ZombieLoad. Section 6 demonstrates ZombieLoad in real-world
attack scenarios. Section 7 discusses possible countermeasures. We
conclude in Section 8.
Responsible Disclosure. We provided Intel with a PoC leaking
uncacheable-typed memory locations from a concurrent hyper-
thread on March 28, 2018. We clarified to Intel on May 30, 2018,
that we attribute the source of this leakage to the LFB. In our ex-
periments, this works identically for Foreshadow (Meltdown-P),
undermining the completeness of L1-flush-based mitigations. This
issue was acknowledged by Intel and tracked under CVE-2019-
11091. We responsibly disclosed the main attack presented in this
paper to Intel on April 12, 2019. Intel verified and acknowledged
our findings and assigned CVE-2018-12130 to this issue. Both issues
were part of an embargo ending on May 14, 2019.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the background required for this paper.
2.1 Transient Execution Attacks
Today’s high-performance processors typically implement an out-
of-order execution design, allowing the CPU to utilize different exe-
cution units in parallel. The instruction stream is decoded in-order
into simpler micro-operations (µOPs) [15] which can be executed
as soon as the required operands are available. A dedicated reorder
buffer stores intermediate results and ensures that instruction re-
sults are committed to the architectural state in the order specified
by the program’s instruction stream. Any fault that occurred during
the execution of an instruction is handled at instruction retirement,
leading to a pipeline flush which squashes any outstanding µOP
results from the reorder buffer.
In addition, modern CPUs employ speculative execution optimiza-
tions to avoid stalling the instruction pipeline until a conditional
branch is resolved. The processor predicts the most likely outcome
of the branch and continues execution along that direction. If the
branch is resolved and the prediction was correct, the speculative
results retire in-order yielding a measurable performance improve-
ment. On the other hand, if the prediction was wrong, the pipeline
is flushed, and any speculative results are squashed in the reorder
buffer. We refer to instructions that are executed speculatively or
out-of-order but whose results are never architecturally committed
as transient instructions [9, 45, 68].
While the results and the architectural effects of transient instruc-
tions are discarded, measurable microarchitectural side effects may
remain and are not reverted. Attacks that exploit these side effects
to observe sensitive information are called transient execution at-
tacks [9, 42, 45]. Typically, these attacks utilize a cache-based covert
channel to transmit the secret data observed transiently from the
microarchitectural domain to an architectural state. However, other
covert channels can be utilized as well [6, 62]. In line with a recent
exhaustive survey [9], we refer to attacks exploiting mispredic-
tion [29, 40, 42, 43, 49] as Spectre-type, whereas attacks exploiting
transient execution after a CPU exception [9, 40, 45, 67, 68, 75] are
classified as belonging to Meltdown-type.
2.2 Memory Subsystem
The CPU architecture defines different instructions to load data
from memory. In this section, we give a high-level overview of how
out-of-order CPUs handle memory loads. However, as the actual
implementation of the microarchitecture is usually not publicly
documented, we rely on patents held by Intel to back up possible
implementation details.
Caches. To improve the performance of memory accesses, CPUs
contain small and fast internal caches that store frequently used
data. Caches are typically organized inmultiple levels that are either
private per core or shared amongst them. Modern CPUs typically
use n-way set-associative caches containing n cache lines per set,
each typically 64 B wide. Usually, modern Intel CPUs have a private
first-level instruction (L1I) and data cache (L1D) and a unified L2
cache. The last-level cache (LLC) is shared across all cores.
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Virtual Memory. CPUs use virtual memory to provide memory
isolation between processes. Virtual addresses are translated to
physical memory locations using multi-level translation tables. The
translation table entries define the properties, e.g., access control or
memory type, of the referenced memory region. The CPU contains
the translation-look-aside buffer (TLB) consisting of additional
caches to store address-translation information.
Memory Order Buffer. µOPs that deal with memory operations
are handled by dedicated execution units. Typically, Intel CPUs
contain 2 units responsible for loading data and one for storing
data.While the reorder buffer resolves register dependencies, out-of-
order executed µOPs can still have memory dependencies. In an out-
of-order CPU, thememory order buffer (MOB), incorporating a load
buffer and a store buffer, controls the dispatch of memory operations
and tracks their progress to resolve memory dependencies.
Data Loads. For every dispatched load operation an entry is
allocated in the load buffer and in the reorder buffer. The allocated
load-buffer entry holds information about the operation, e.g., or-
dering constraints, the reorder buffer ID or the age of the most
recent store. To determine the physical address, the upper 36 bit
of the linear address are translated by the memory management
unit. Concurrently, the untranslated lower 12 bit are already used
to index the cache set in the L1D [19]. If the address translation is
cached in the TLB, the physical address is available immediately.
Otherwise, the page miss handler (PMH) is activated to perform a
page-table walk to retrieve the address translation as well as the
corresponding permission bits. With the physical address, the tag
and, thus, the way of the cache is determined. If the requested data
is in the L1D (cache hit), the load operation can be completed.
If data is not in the L1D, it needs to be served from higher levels
of the cache or the main memory via the line-fill buffer (LFB). The
LFB serves as an interface to other caches and the mainmemory and
keeps track of outstanding loads. Memory accesses to uncacheable
memory regions, and non-temporal moves all go through the LFB.
If a load corresponds to an entry of a previous load operation in
the load buffer, the loads can be merged [1, 57].
On a fault, e.g., a physical address is not available, the page-
table walk will not immediately abort [19]. Still, an instruction in a
pipelined implementation must undergo each stage regardless of
whether a fault occurred or not [2], and is reissued in case of a fault.
Only at the retirement of the faulting µOP, the fault is handled,
and the pipeline is flushed [18, 19]. If a fault occurs within a load
operation, it is still marked as “valid and completed” in the MOB [2].
2.3 Processor Extensions
Microcode. Initially, all instructions were hardwired in the CPU
core. However, to support more complex instructions, microcode al-
lows implementing higher-level instructions usingmultiple hardware-
level instructions. Importantly, this allows processor vendors to
support complex behavior and even extend or modify CPU behavior
through microcode updates [31]. Preferably, new architectural fea-
tures are implemented as microcode extensions, e.g., Intel SGX [38].
While the execution units perform the fast-paths directly in hard-
ware, more complex slow-path operations are typically performed
by issuing a microcode assist which points the sequencer to a prede-
fined microcode routine [13]. To do so, the execution unit associates
an event code with the result of the faulting micro-op. When the
micro-op of the execution unit is committed, the event code causes
the out-of-order scheduler to squash all in-flight micro-ops in the
reorder buffer [13]. The microcode sequencer uses the event code to
read the micro-ops associated with the event in the microcode [7].
Intel TSX. Intel TSX is an x86 instruction set extension to sup-
port hardware transactional memory [35] which has been intro-
duced with Intel Haswell CPUs. With TSX, particular code regions
are executed transactionally. If the entire code regions completes
successfully, memory operations within the transaction appear as
an atomic commit to other logical processors. If an issue occurs
during the transaction, a transactional abort rolls back the execu-
tion to an architectural state before the transaction and, thereby,
discarding all performed operations. Transactional aborts can be
caused by different issues: Typically, a conflicting memory opera-
tion occurs where another logical processor either reads from an
address which has been modified within the transaction or writes
to an address which is used within the transaction. Further, the
amount of read and written data within the transaction may not
exceed the size of the LLC and L1 cache respectively for the transac-
tion to succeed [31]. In addition, some instructions or system event
might cause the transaction to abort as well [35].
Intel SGX. With the Skylake microarchitecture, Intel introduced
Software Guard Extension (SGX), an instruction-set extension for
isolating trusted code [31]. SGX executes trusted code inside so-
called enclaves, which are mapped in the virtual address space of a
conventional host application process but are isolated from the rest
of the system by the hardware itself. The threat model of SGX as-
sumes that the operating system and all other running applications
could be compromised and, therefore, cannot be trusted. Any at-
tempt to access SGX enclave memory in non-enclave mode results
in abort page semantics, i.e., regardless of the current privilege level,
reads return the dummy value 0xff and writes are ignored [30].
Furthermore, to protect against powerful physical attackers prob-
ing the memory bus, the SGX hardware transparently encrypts the
memory region used by enclaves [13].
A dedicated eenter instruction redirects control flow to an en-
clave entry point, whereas eexit transfers back to the untrusted
host application. Furthermore, in case of an interrupt or fault, SGX
securely saves CPU registers inside the enclave’s save state area
(SSA) before vectoring to the untrusted operating system. Next, the
eresume instruction can be used to restore processor state from the
SSA frame and continue a previously interrupted enclave.
SGX-capable processors feature cryptographic key derivation
facilities through the egetkey instruction, based on a CPU-level
master secret and a secure measurement of the calling enclave’s ini-
tial code and data. Using this key, enclaves can securely seal secrets
for untrusted persistent storage, and establish secure communica-
tion channels with other enclaves residing on the same processor.
Furthermore, to enable remote attestation, Intel provides a trusted
quoting enclave which unseals an Intel-private key and generates
an asymmetric signature over the local enclave identity report.
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Over the past years, researchers have demonstrated various at-
tacks to leak sensitive data from SGX enclaves, e.g., through mem-
ory safety violations [44], race conditions [74], or side-channels [54,
63, 70, 71]. More recently, SGX was also compromised by transient
execution attacks [11, 68] which necessitated microcode updates
and increased the processor’s security version number (SVN). All
SGX key derivations and attestations include SVN to reflect the
current microcode version, and hence security level.
3 ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an overview of ZombieLoad. We describe
what can be observed using ZombieLoad and how that fits into the
landscape of existing side-channel attacks. By that, we show that
ZombieLoad is a novel category of side-channel attacks, which we
refer to as data-sampling attacks, opening a new research field.
3.1 Overview
ZombieLoad is a transient-execution attack [9] which observes the
values of memory loads on the current physical CPU. ZombieLoad
exploits that the fill buffer is accessible by all logical CPUs of a phys-
ical CPU core and that it does not distinguish between processes
or privilege levels.
The load buffer acts as a queue for all memory loads from the
memory subsystem. Whenever the CPU encounters a memory load
during execution, it reserves an entry in the load buffer. If the load
was not an L1 hit, it additionally requires a fill-buffer entry. When
the requested data has been loaded, the memory subsystem frees
the corresponding load- and fill-buffer entries, at which point the
corresponding load instruction may retire.
However, we observed that under certain complex microarchitec-
tural conditions (e.g., a fault), where the load requires a microcode
assist, it may first read stale values before being re-issued eventu-
ally. As with any Meltdown-type attack, this opens up a transient
execution window in which this value can be used for subsequent
calculations before the execution is aborted and rolled back. Thus,
an attacker can encode the leaked value into a microarchitectural
element, such as the cache.
In contrast to previous Meltdown-type attacks, however, it is not
possible to select the value to leak based on an attacker-specified ad-
dress. ZombieLoad simply leaks any value which is currently loaded
by the physical CPU core. While this at first sounds like a massive
limitation, we show that this opens a new field of side-channel
attacks. We show that ZombieLoad is an even more powerful attack
when combined with existing techniques known from traditional
side-channel attacks.
3.2 Microarchitectural Root Cause
For Meltdown, Foreshadow, and Fallout, the source of the leakage
is apparent. Moreover, for these attacks, there are plausible expla-
nations on what is going wrong in the microarchitecture, i.e., what
the root cause of the leakage is [45, 53, 68, 75]. For ZombieLoad,
however, this is not entirely clear.
While we identified some necessary building blocks to observe
the leakage (cf. Section 5), we can only provide a hypothesis on why
the interaction of the building blocks leads to the observed leakage.
As we could only observe data leakage on Intel CPUs, we assume
that this is indeed an implementation issue (such as Meltdown) and
not an issue with the underlying design (as with Spectre). For our
hypothesis, we combined our observations with the nearly non-
existent official documentation of the fill buffer [31, 32]. Ultimately,
we could neither prove nor disprove our hypothesis, leaving the
verification or falsification of our hypothesis to future work.
Stale-Entry Hypothesis. Every load is associated with an entry
in the load buffer and potentially an entry in the fill buffer [32].
When a load encounters a complex situation, such as a fault,
it requires a microcode assist [31]. This microcode assist triggers
a machine clear, which flushes the pipeline. On a pipeline flush,
instructions which are already in flight still finish execution [28].
As this has to be as fast as possible to not incur additional delays,
we expect that fill-buffer entries are optimistically matched as long
as parts of the physical address match. Thus, the load continues
with a wrong fill-buffer entry, which was valid for a previous load.
This leads to a use-after-free vulnerability [24] in the hardware.
Intel documents the fill buffer as being competitively shared among
hyperthreads [31], giving both logical cores access to the entire fill
buffer (cf. Appendix A). Consequently, the stale fill-buffer entry can
also be from a previous load of the sibling logical core. As a result,
the load instruction loads valid data from a previous load.
Leakage Source. We devised 2 experiments to reduce the num-
ber of possible sources of the leaked data.
In our first experiment, we marked a page as “uncacheable” via
the page-table entry and flushed the page from the cache. As a result,
every memory load from the page circumvents all cache levels and
directly travels from themainmemory to the fill buffer [31].We then
write the secret onto the uncacheable memory page to ensure that
there is no copy of the data in the cache.When loading data from the
uncacheable memory page, we can see leakage, but the leakage rate
is only in the order of bytes per second, e.g., 5.91 B/s (σx¯ = 0.18,
n = 100) on an i7-8650U. We can attribute this leakage to the fill
buffer. This was also exploited in concurrent work [72]. Our hy-
pothesis is further backed by the MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.FB_HIT per-
formance counter, which shows multiple thousand line-fill-buffer
hits (117 330 FB_HIT/s (σx¯ = 511.57, n = 100)).
Intel claims that the leakage is entirely from the fill buffer. How-
ever, our second experiment shows that the line-fill buffer might
not be the only source of the leakage. We rely on Intel TSX to ensure
that memory accesses do not reach the line-fill buffer as follows.
Inside a transaction, we first write the secret value to a memory
location which was previously initialized with a different value.
The write inside the transaction ensures that the address is in the
write set of the transaction and thus in L1 [32, 60]. Evicting data
from the write set from the cache leads to a transactional abort [32].
Hence, any subsequent memory access to the data from the write
set ensures that it is served from the L1, and therefore, no request
to the line-fill buffer is sent [31]. In this experiment, we see a much
higher rate of leakage which is in the order of kilobytes per second.
More importantly, we only see the value written inside the TSX
transaction and not the value that was at the memory location
before starting the transaction. Our hypothesis that the line-fill
buffer is not the only source of the leakage is further backed by
observing performance counters. The MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.FB_HIT
and MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.L1_MISS performance counters, do not
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Figure 1:The 3 properties of amemory operation: instruction
pointer of the program, target address, and data value. So far,
there are techniques to infer the instruction pointer from
target address and the data value from the address. With
ZombieLoad, we show the first instance of an attack which
infers the data value from the instruction pointer.
increase significantly. In contrast, the MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.L1_HIT
performance counter shows multiple thousand L1 hits.
While accessing the data to leak on the victim core, we moni-
tored the MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.FB_HIT performance counter on the
attacker core for 10 s. If the address was cached, we measured a
Pearson correlation of rp = 0.02 (n = 100) between the correct re-
coveries and line-fill buffer hits, indicating no association. However,
while continuously flushing the data on the victim core, ensuring
that a subsequent access must go through the LFB, we measure
a strong correlation of rp = 0.86 (n = 100). This result indicates
that the line-fill buffer is not the only source of leakage. However,
a different explanation might be that the performance counters are
not reliable in such corner cases. Future work has to investigate
whether other microarchitectural elements, e.g., the load buffer, are
also involved in the observed data leakage.
3.3 Classification
In this section, we introduce a way to classify memory-based side-
channel and transient-execution attacks. For all these attacks, we
assume a target program which executes a memory operation at a
certain address with a specific data value at the program’s current
instruction pointer. Figure 1 illustrates these three properties as the
corner of a triangle, and techniques which let an attacker infer one
of the properties based on one or both of the other properties.
Traditionalmemory-based side-channel attacks allow an attacker
to observe the location of memory accesses. The granularity of
the location observation depends on the spatial accuracy of the
used side channel. Most common memory-based side-channel at-
tacks [20, 22, 23, 25, 37, 56, 58, 71, 78, 79] have a granularity be-
tween one cache line [22, 23, 25, 79] i.e., usually 64 B, and one
page [20, 37, 71, 78], i.e., usually 4 kB. These side channels establish
a connection between the time domain and the space domain. The
time domain can either be the wall time or also commonly the exe-
cution time of the program which correlates with the instruction
pointer. These classic side channels provide means of connecting
the address of a memory access to a set of possible instruction
pointers, which then allows reconstructing the program flow. Thus,
side-channel resistant applications have to avoid secret-dependent
memory access to not leak secrets to a side-channel attacker.
Since early 2018, with transient execution attacks [9] such as
Meltdown [45] and Spectre [42], there is a second type of attacks
which allow an attacker to observe the value stored at a memory
address. Meltdown provided the most control over target address.
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Figure 2:Meltdown-type attacks provide a varying degree of
target control (gray hatched), from full virtual addresses in
the case of Meltdown to nearly no control for ZombieLoad.
With Meltdown, the full virtual address of the target data is pro-
vided, and the corresponding data value stored at this address is
leaked. The success rate depends on the location of the data, i.e.,
whether it is in the cache or main memory. However, the only con-
straint for Meltdown is that the data is addressable using a virtual
address [45]. Other Meltdown-type attacks [53, 68] also connect
addresses to data values. However, they often impose additional
constraints, such as that the data has to be cached in L1 [68, 75],
the physical address has to be known [75], or that an attacker can
choose only parts of the target address [53].
Figure 2 illustrates which parts of the virtual and physical address
an attacker can choose to target data values to leak. For Meltdown,
the virtual address is sufficient to target data in the same address
space [45]. Foreshadow already requires knowledge of the physical
address and the least-significant 12 bits of the virtual address to
target any data in the L1, not limited to the own address space [68,
75]. When leaking the last writes from the store buffer, an attacker
is already limited in choosing which value to leak. It is only possible
to filter stores based on the least-significant 12 bits of the virtual
address, a more targeted leakage is not possible [53].
Zombie loads provide no control over the leaked address to an
attacker. The only possible target selection is the byte index inside
the loaded data, which can be seen as an address with up to 6-bit
in case an entire cache line is loaded. Hence, we do not count Zom-
bieLoad as an attack which leaks data values based on the address.
Instead, from the viewpoint of the target control, ZombieLoad is
more similar to traditional memory-based side-channel attacks.
With ZombieLoad, an attacker observes the data value of a memory
access. Thus, this side channel establishes a connection between the
time domain and the data value. Again, the time domain correlates
with the instruction pointer of the target address. ZombieLoad is
the first instance of a class of attacks which connects the instruc-
tion pointer with the data value of a memory access. We refer to
such attacks as data sampling attacks. Essentially, this new class of
data sampling attacks is capable of breaking side-channel resistant
applications, such as constant-time cryptographic algorithms [27].
Following the classification scheme from Canella et al. [9], Zom-
bieLoad is a Meltdown-type transient execution attack, and we
propose Meltdown-MCA as the generic name. This reflects that the
(microarchitectural) fault type being exploited by ZombieLoad is
the microcode assist (MCA, explained further).
4 ATTACK SCENARIOS & ATTACKER MODEL
Following most side-channel attacks, we assume the attacker can
execute unprivileged native code on the target machine. Thus, we
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assume a trusted operating system if not stated otherwise. This
relatively weak attacker model is sufficient to mount ZombieLoad.
However, we also show that the increased attacker capabilities
offered in certain scenarios, e.g., SGX and hypervisor attacks, may
further amplify the leakagewhile remainingwithin the threatmodel
of the respective scenario.
At the hardware level, we assume a ubiquitous Intel CPU with
simultaneous multithreading (SMT, also known as hyperthreading)
enabled. Crucially, we do not rely on existing vulnerabilities, such
as Meltdown [45], Foreshadow [68, 75], or Fallout [53].
User-Space Leakage. In the cross-process user-space scenario,
an unprivileged attacker leaks values loaded by another concur-
rently running user-space application. We consider such a cross-
process scenario most dangerous for end users, who are not com-
monly using Intel SGX nor virtual machines. Moreover, many
secrets are likely to be found in user-space applications such as
browsers or password managers.
The attacker can execute unprivileged code and is co-located
with the victim on the same physical but a different logical CPU
core. This is a typical case for hyperthreading, where both attacker
and victim run on one hyperthread of the same CPU.
Kernel Leakage. In addition to leakage across user-space appli-
cations, ZombieLoad can also leak across the privilege boundary
between user and kernel space. We demonstrate that the value of
loads executed in kernel space is leaked to an unprivileged attacker,
executing either on the same or a sibling logical core.
In this scenario, the unprivileged attacker performs a system call
to the kernel, running on the same logical core. Importantly, we
found that kernel load leakage may even survive the switch back
from the kernel to user space. Hyperthreading is hence not a strict
requirement for this scenario.
Intel SGX Leakage. In addition to leaking values loaded by the
kernel, ZombieLoad can observe loads executed inside an Intel SGX
enclave. In this scenario, the attacker is executing on a sibling logical
core, co-located with the victim enclave on the same physical core.
We demonstrate that ZombieLoad can leak secrets loaded during the
enclave’s execution from a concurrent logical core, but we did not
observe leakage on the same logical core after exiting the enclave
synchronously (eexit) or asynchronously (on interrupt).
While in the aftermath of the Foreshadow [68] attack, current
SGX attestations indicate whether hyperthreading has been en-
abled at boot time, Intel’s official security advisory [34] merely
suggests that a remote verifier might reject attestations from a
hyperthreading-enabled system “if it deems the risk of potential
attacks from the sibling logical processor as not acceptable”. Hence,
machines with up-to-date patched microcode may still run with
hyperthreading enabled.
Within the SGX threat model, we can leverage the attacker’s first
rate control over the untrusted operating system. An attacker can,
for instance, modify page table entries [71], or precisely execute
the victim enclave at most one instruction at a time [69].
Virtual Machine Leakage. With ZombieLoad, it is possible
to leak loaded values across virtual-machine boundaries. In this
scenario, an attacker running inside a virtual machine can leak
values from a different virtual machine co-located on the same
Table 1: Overview of different variants to induce zombie
loads in different scenarios.
Scenario
Variant 1 2
Unprivileged Attacker
Privileged Attacker (root)
Symbols indicate whether a variant can be used in the corresponding attack scenario
( ), can be used depending on the hardware configuration as discussed in Section 5.1
( ), or cannot be used ( ).
Page p
2MB
User mapping
v
4 KB
2MB
Kernel
address
k 4 KB
2MB
cache line
flushfaulting load
Figure 3: Variant 1: Using huge kernel pages for ZombieLoad.
Page p is mapped using a user-accessible address (v) and
a kernel-space huge page (k). Flushing v and then reading
from k using Meltdown leaks values from the fill buffer.
physical but different logical core. Thus, an attacker can leak values
loaded from a virtual machine running on the sibling logical core.
As the attacker is running inside an untrusted virtual machine,
the attacker is not restricted to unprivileged code execution. Thus,
the attacker can, for instance, modify guest-page-table entries.
Hypervisor Leakage. In the hypervisor scenario, an attacker
running inside a virtual machine utilizes ZombieLoad to leak the
value of loads executed by the hypervisor.
As the attacker is running inside an untrusted virtual machine,
the attacker is not restricted to unprivileged code execution.
5 BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we describe the building blocks for the attack.
5.1 Zombie Loads
The main primitive for mounting ZombieLoad is a load which trig-
gers a microcode assist, resulting in a transient load containing
wrong data. We refer to such a load as a zombie load. Zombie loads
are loads which either architecturally or microarchitecturally fault
and thus cannot complete, requiring a re-issue of the load at a
later point. We identified multiple different scenarios to create such
zombie loads required for a successful attack. All variants have in
common that they abuse the clflush instruction to reliably create
the conditions required for leaking from a wrong destination (cf.
Section 3.2). In this section, we describe 2 different variants that
can be used to leak data (cf. Section 5.2) depending on the adver-
ary’s capabilities. Table 1 overviews which variant is applicable in
which scenario, depending on the operating system and underlying
hardware configuration.
Variant 1: Kernel Mapping. The first variant is a ZombieLoad
setup which does not rely on any specific CPU feature. We require
a kernel virtual address k , i.e., an address where the user-accessible
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bit is not set in the page-table entry. In practice, the kernel is usually
mapped with huge pages (i.e., 2 MB pages). Thus k refers to a 2 MB
physical page p. Note that although we use such huge pages for
our experiments, it is not strictly required, as the setup also works
with 4 kB pages. We also require the user to have read access to the
content of the physical page through a different virtual address v .
Figure 3 illustrates such a setup. In this setup, accessing the page
p via the user-accessible virtual address v provides an architec-
turally valid way to access the contents of the page. Accessing the
same page via the kernel address k results in a zombie load similar
to Meltdown [45] requiring a microcode assist. Note that while
there are other ways to construct an inaccessible address k , e.g., by
clearing the present bit [68], we were only able to exploit zombie
loads originating from kernel mappings.
To create precisely the scenario depicted in Figure 3, we allocate
a page p in the user space with the virtual address v. Note that
p is a regular 4 kB page which is accessible through the virtual
address v. We retrieve its physical address through /proc/pagemap,
or alternatively using a side channel [22, 36]. Using the physical
address and the base address of the direct-physical map, we get an
inaccessible kernel address k which maps to the allocated page p. If
the operating system does not use stronger kernel isolation [21],
e.g., KPTI [47], the direct-physical map in the kernel is mapped in
the user space and uses huge pages which are marked as not user
accessible. In the case of a privileged attacker, e.g., when attacking
a hypervisor or SGX enclave, an attacker can easily create such
pages if they do not exist.
Variant 2: Microcode-Assisted Page-Table Walk. A variant
similar to Variant 1 is to trigger a microcode-assisted page-table
walk. If a page-table walk requires an update to the access or dirty
bit in the page-table entry, it falls back to a microcode assist [13].
In this setup, we require one physical page p which has 2 user-
accessible virtual addresses, v and v2. This can be easily achieved
by using a shared-memory segment or memory-mapped file, which
is mapped twice in the application. The virtual address v can be
used to access the contents of p architecturally. For v2, we have
to clear the accessed bit in the page-table entry. On Linux, this is
not possible in the case of an unprivileged attacker, and can thus
only be used in attacks where we assume a privileged attacker
(cf. Section 4). However, we experimentally verified that Windows
10 (1803 build 17134.706) periodically clears the accessed bits. We
assume that the page-replacement algorithm is responsible for this.
Thus, this variant enables the attack on Windows for unprivileged
attackers.
When accessing the page through the virtual address v2, the
accessed bit of the page-table entry has to be set. This, however,
cannot be done by the page-miss handler [13]. Instead, microar-
chitecturally, the load faults, and a micro-code assist is triggered
which repeats the page-table walk and sets the accessed bit [13].
If the access to v2 is done transiently, i.e., behind a misspecu-
lated branch or after an exception, the accessed bit cannot be set
architecturally. Thus, the leakage is not only exploitable once but
instead for every access.
5.2 Data Leakage
To leak data with the setup described in Section 5.1, we constantly
flush the first cache line of p through the virtual address v. We
achieve this by executing the unprivileged clflush instruction (or
clflushopt instruction if available) on the user-accessible virtual
address v. For Variant 1, we leverage Meltdown to read from the
kernel address k which maps to the cache line flushed before. As
with Meltdown-US [45], various methods of preventing an archi-
tectural exception can be used. We verified that ZombieLoad with
Variant 1 works with exception prevention (i.e., speculative execu-
tion), handling (i.e., a custom signal handler), and suppression (i.e.,
Intel TSX).
For Variant 2, we transiently, i.e., behind a mispredicted branch,
read from the address v2.
Counterintuitively, the resulting values leaked for all variants
are not coming from page p. Instead, we get access to data which is
currently loaded on the current or sibling logical CPU core. Thus,
it appears that we reuse fill-buffer entries, and leak the data which
the entries references. For Variant 1 and Variant 2, this allowed
us to access all bytes from the cache line that the fill-buffer entry
references.
5.3 Data Sampling
Independent of the setup for ZombieLoad, we cannot directly con-
trol the address of the data to leak. Both the virtual addresses k
and v, as well as the physical address of p is arbitrary and does not
correlate with the leaked data. In any case, we simply get the value
referenced by one fill-buffer entry which we cannot specify.
However, there is at least control within the fill-buffer entry,
i.e., we can target specific bytes within the 64 B fill-buffer entry.
The least-significant 6 bits of the virtual address v refer to the byte
within the fill-buffer entry. Hence, we can target a single byte at a
specific position from the fill-buffer entry. While at first, this does
not sound powerful, it allows leaking sensitive information, such
as AES keys, byte-by-byte as shown in Section 6.1.
As described in Section 4, the leakage is not limited to the own
process. With ZombieLoad, we observe values from all processes
running on the same as well as on the sibling logical CPU core.
Furthermore, we also observe leakage across privilege boundaries,
i.e., from the kernel, hypervisor, and Intel SGX enclaves. Thus,
ZombieLoad allows sampling of all data which is loaded by any
application on the current physical CPU core.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate ZombieLoad and the performance of
our proof-of-concept implementations1.
Environment. Weevaluated the different variants of ZombieLoad,
described in Section 5.1, on different environments listed in Table 2.
The tested CPUs range from Sandy Bridge (released 2012) to Cas-
cade Lake (released 2019). We were able to mount Variant 1 and
Variant 2 on different microarchitectures except for Whiskey Lake,
Coffee Lake-R, and Cascade Lake-SP.
1https://github.com/IAIK/ZombieLoad
Schwarz et al.
Table 2: Tested environments.
Variant
Setup CPU µ-arch. 1 2
Lab Core i7-3630QM Ivy Bridge ✓ ✓
Lab Core i7-6700K Skylake-S ✓ ✓
Lab Core i5-7300U Kaby Lake ✓ ✓
Lab Core i7-7700 Kaby Lake ✓ ✓
Lab Core i7-8650U Kaby Lake-R ✓ ✓
Lab Core i7-8565U Whiskey Lake ✗ ✗
Lab Core i7-8700K Coffee Lake-S ✓ ✓
Lab Core i9-9900K Coffee Lake-R ✗ ✗
Lab Xeon E5-1630 v4 Broadwell-EP ✓ ✓
Cloud Xeon E5-2670 Sandy Bridge-EP ✓ ✓
Cloud Xeon Gold 5120 Skylake-SP ✓ ✓
Cloud Xeon Platinum 8175M Skylake-SP ✓ ✓
Cloud Xeon Gold 5218 Cascade Lake-SP ✗ ✗
Performance. To evaluate the performance of each variant, we
performed the following experiment on an i7-8650U. While reading
a specific value on one logical core, we performed each variant
of ZombieLoad on the sibling logical core for 10 s, recording the
number of successful and unsuccessful recoveries. For Variant 1
using TSX to suppress the exception, we achieve an average trans-
mission rate of 5.30 kB/s (σx¯ = 0.076, n = 1000) and a true positive
rate of 85.74 % (σx¯ = 0.0046, n = 1000). With Variant 2 in combi-
nation with signal handling, we achieved an average transmission
rate of 0.08 kB/s (σx¯ = 0.002, n = 1000) and a true positive rate
of 52.7 % (σx¯ = 0.0062, n = 1000). Variant 2 in combination with
TSX, achieves an average transmission rate of 7.73 kB/s (σx¯ = 0.21,
n = 1000) and a true positive rate of 76.28 % (σx¯ = 0.0055,n = 1000).
6 CASE STUDY ATTACKS
In this section, we present 5 attacks using ZombieLoad in real-world
scenarios.
6.1 AES-NI Key Leakage
To demonstrate that data sampling is a powerful side channel, we ex-
tract an AES-128 key. The victim application uses AES-NI, which is
resistant against timing and cache-based side-channel attacks [27].
However, even with the hardware-assisted AES-NI, the key has
to be loaded from memory to a 128-bit XMM register. This is usu-
ally the case before invoking AESKEYGENASSIST, which is used to
derive the AES round keys. The round-key derivation is entirely
done in hardware using the XMM registers. Hence, there is no
memory load required for the derivation of the 11 round keys used
in AES-128. Thus, when the key is loaded from memory before
the round-key derivation starts is the point where we can mount
ZombieLoad to leak the value of the key. For OpenSSL (v3.0.0),
this is in the function aesni_set_encrypt_key which is called by
EVP_EncryptInit_ex. Note that instead of leaking the key, we can
also leak the round keys loaded in the encryption process. However,
to attack the round keys, an attacker needs to leak (and distinguish)
more different values, making the attack more complex.
When leaking the key using ZombieLoad, we have first to detect
which load corresponds to the key. Moreover, as we can only leak
(4,4)-dominon,n+1 (0x21)
(7,1)-dominon,n+1 (0xA4)
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
keyn (0xD2)
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
keyn+1 (0x1C)
Figure 4: Additionally leaking domino bytes comprised of
bits of different AES-key bytes to filter out unrelated loads.
one byte at a time, we also have to combine the leaked bytes to the
full AES-128 key correctly.
Side-Channel Synchronization. For the attack, we assume a
shared library implementing the AES encryption which can be used
by both the attacker and the victim, e.g., OpenSSL. Even though
OpenSSL (v3.0.0) has a side-channel resistant AES-NI implementa-
tion, we can still rely on classical memory-based side-channel at-
tacks to monitor the control flow. For example, using Flush+Reload,
we can detect when a specific part of the code is executed [16, 25].
While this does not leak any secrets, it acts as a synchronization
primitive for ZombieLoad.
We constantly monitor a cache line of the code which is executed
right before the key is loaded from memory. In OpenSSL (v3.0.0),
this is the second cache line of aesni_set_encrypt_key, i.e., 64 B
after the start of the function. Similarly to Schwarz et al. [60], we
leverage the cache state of the cache line as a trigger for the actual
attack. Only if we detect a cache hit on the monitored cache line,
we start leaking values using ZombieLoad. Hence, we already filter
out most bytes not related to the AES key.
Note that if there is no cache line before the load which can be
used as a trigger, we can still use a nearby cache line (i.e., a cache
line after the load) as a filter. In a parallel thread, we collect the
timestamps of cache hits in the nearby cache line. If we also save the
time stamps of the values leaked using ZombieLoad, in an offline
post-processing step we can filter out values which were leaked at
a different instruction-pointer location.
To further reduce unrelated loads, it is also possible to slow
down the victim using performance-degradation techniques such
as flushing the code [3, 16]. For OpenSSL, we used performance
degradation on the code directly following the load of the key.
Domino Attack. Inevitably, even when synchronizing Zom-
bieLoad by using a cache-based trigger, we also leak values not
related to the key. Moreover, for practical reasons, the size of the
Flush+Reload covert channel is limited, and we can only transmit
a single key byte from the transient domain at a time. Hence, we
have a probability distribution for every byte in the AES key. As
the bytes in the AES key are independent of each other, we can
only assume that the byte with the highest probability is the correct
key byte. Thus, if there is a key byte suffering from noise from
unrelated loads, we may assume that the noise is the correct key
byte, which leads to a wrong key.
Therefore, we propose the Domino attack, an innovative tran-
sient error detection technique for reducing noise when leaking
multi-byte loads. In addition to leaking every single key byte, we
also transmit a specially crafted domino byte composed by com-
bining bits from two adjacent key bytes. Note that creating such
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a domino byte is possible, as the transient domain has access to
the full AES key and can use it for arbitrary computations (cf. Sec-
tion 6.3). Figure 4 illustrates the idea of the Domino attack. In this
case, we leak (4,4) domino bytes consisting of 4 bits of two adjacent
key bytes respectively. By combining the lower nibble of one key
byte with the higher nibble of the next key byte, we transmit a
domino byte which encodes partial information of two key bytes.
Hence, in a post-processing step, we combine the probability distri-
bution of two adjacent key bytes with the probability distribution
of the domino byte to select the two adjacent key bytes with the
highest combined probability. Note that the selection of bits can be
adapted to the noise which can be measured before leaking the key,
e.g., multiple (7,1) domino bytes can be leaked that are shifted by
only a single bit.
Results. We evaluated the attack in a cross-user-space attack
(cf. Section 4). We always ran the attack until the correct key was
recovered, i.e., until the key with the highest probability is the
correct key. In a practical attack, the number of attacks can even be
reduced, as typically it is easy to verify whether a key candidate is
correct. Thus, an attacker can simply test all key candidates with a
probability over a certain threshold and does not have to wait until
the highest probability corresponds to the correct key.
On average, we recovered the entire AES-128 key of the victim
in under 10 s using the cache-based trigger and the Domino attack.
During this time, the key was loaded approximately 10 000 times
by the victim.
6.2 SGX Sealing Key Extraction
In this section, we show that privileged SGX attackers can drasti-
cally improve ZombieLoad’s temporal resolution and bridge from
incidental data sampling in the time domain to the targeted re-
construction of arbitrary enclave secrets (cf. Figure 1). We first
explain how state-of-the-art enclave execution control and tran-
sient post-processing techniques can be leveraged to reliably leak
register values at any point during an enclave invocation. Then we
demonstrate the impact of this attack by recovering a full 128-bit
SGX sealing key, as used by Intel’s trusted provision and quoting
enclaves to decrypt the long-term EPID private attestation key.
Leaking Enclave Registers. We consider Intel SGX root attack-
ers that co-locate with a victim enclave on the same physical CPU.
As a system attacker, we can increase ZombieLoad’s temporal res-
olution by leveraging previous research results exploiting page
faults [71, 78] or interrupts [54, 70] to regulate the victim enclave’s
execution. We use the SGX-Step [69] framework to precisely single-
step the victim enclave one instruction at a time, allowing the
attacker to reach a code part where sensitive information is stored
in CPU registers. At such a point, we switch to unlimited zero-
stepping [68] by either setting the system timer interrupt to a very
short interval or revoking code page execute permissions before
resuming the victim enclave. This technique provides ZombieLoad
attackers with a primitive to repeatedly force-reload CPU regis-
ters from the interrupted enclave’s SSA frame (cf. Section 2.3). Our
experiments show that even though execution of the enclave in-
struction never completes, any direct operands plus SSA register
file contents are loaded from memory each time. Importantly, since
the enclave does not make progress, we can perform unlimited
ZombieLoad attack attempts to reconstruct CPU register values
from these implicit SSA memory accesses.
We further reduce noise from unrelated non-enclave loads on
the victim CPU by opting for timer-based zero-stepping with a
user space interrupt handler [70] to avoid repeatedly invoking
the operating system. Furthermore, we found that executing the
ZombieLoad attack code in a separate address space avoids unnec-
essarily slowing down the spy through implicit TLB invalidations
on enclave entry/exit [30].
Note that the SSA frame spans multiple cache lines. With Zom-
bieLoad, we do not have explicit address-based control over which
cache line is being leaked. Hence, leaked data might come from dif-
ferent saved registers that are at the same offset within a cache line.
To filter out such noisy observations, we use the Domino transient
error detection technique introduced in Section 6.1. Specifically, we
implemented a “sliding window” that transmits 7 different domino
bytes for each candidate key byte, stuffed with increasing bits from
the next adjacent key byte candidate. Any noisy observations that
do not match the overlap can now efficiently be filtered out.
Attack on sgx_get_key. The Intel SGX design includes a se-
cure key derivation facility through the egetkey instruction (cf.
Section 2.3). Enclaves execute this instruction to query a 128-bit
cryptographic key from the hardware, based on the calling enclave’s
code layout or developer identity. This is the underlying primitive
used by Intel’s trusted prebuilt quoting enclave to securely unseal
a long-term private attestation key from persistent storage [13, 68].
The official Intel SGX SDK [30] offers a convenient sgx_get_key
wrapper procedure that first executes egetkey with the necessary
parameters, and eventually copies the retrieved key into a provided
buffer. We reverse engineered the proprietary intel_fast_memcpy
function and found that in this case, the key is copied using two 128-
bit moves to/from the xmm0 SSE register. We revert to zero-stepping
on the last instruction of the memcpy invocation. At this point, the
attacker-induced zero-step enclave resumptions will repeatedly
reload a.o., the xmm0 register containing the 128-bit key from the
memory hierarchy.
Results. We evaluated the attack on a Kaby Lake i7-7700 CPU
with an up-to-date Foreshadow-patched microcode revision 0x8e.
In the first experiment, we implemented a benchmark enclave
that uses sgx_get_key to generate a new report key with different
random key IDs. We performed 100 key-recovery experiments on
sgx_get_key with different random keys. Our results show that
30 % of the times the full 128-bit key is among the key candidates
with average remaining key space entropy of 8.8 bits. Among these
cases, 3 % of the times the exact full key has been recovered. In the
other 70 % of the cases where the full key is not among the key
candidates, 31 % of the times, we have partial key bytes among the
recovered key candidates. The average correct key bytes are 10 out
of 16 bytes with the remaining global entropy of 13.59 bits. In the
remaining 39 % of the times where the correct key is not among the
key candidates, our attack which uses the Domino technique with
a sliding window did not reveal any candidates, which means an
attacker can simply repeat the attack in such cases. Also in cases,
where some of the key bytes are part of the candidates, most of
failed key bytes resides in the first few bytes of the key. The reason
Schwarz et al.
for this behavior is that the explained Domino attack will have a
stronger effect on key bytes in the middle that are surrounded by
more key bytes.
In the second experiment, we perform an attack on Intel’s trusted
quoting enclave. The quoting enclave performs a call to sgx_get_key
to derive the sealing key which is used to decrypt the EPID provi-
sioning blob. We executed the attack on a quoting enclave that is
signed with debug keys, so we can use it as a ground truth to easily
verify that we have recovered the correct sealing key. We executed
the attack multiple times on our setup, and we managed to recover
the correct 128-bit sealing key after multiple executions of the at-
tack and checking the candidates against each other. The recovered
sealing key matches the correct key, and can indeed successfully
decrypt the EPID blob for our debug signed quoting enclave. While
we did not yet reproduce this attack to recover the sealing key from
the official quoting enclave image signed by Intel, we believe that
this experimental evaluation showcased all the required primitives
to break Intel SGX’s remote attestation guarantees, as demonstrated
before by Foreshadow [68].
6.3 Cross-VM Covert Channel
To evaluate the performance of ZombieLoad, we implement a covert
channel which can be used for all attack scenarios described in
Section 4. However, in this section, we focus on the cross-VM covert
channel. While covert channels are possible for Intel SGX, the
kernel, and the hypervisor, these are somewhat artificial scenarios.
Moreover, there are various covert channels available to user-space
applications for stealthy inter-process communication [17, 51].
For VMs, however, there are not many known covert chan-
nels which can be used between two VMs. So far, all cross-VM
covert channels either relied on Prime+Probe [46, 50, 51, 59, 77],
DRAMA [58], or bus locking [76]. We show that ZombieLoad can be
used as a fast and reliable covert channel between VMs scheduled
on the same physical core.
Sender. For the fastest result, the sender repeatedly loads the
value to be transmitted from the L1 cache into a register. By not
only loading the value from one memory address but instead from
multiple memory addresses, the sender ensures that potentially
multiple fill-buffer entries are used. In addition, this also thwarts
an optimization of Intel CPUs which combines multiple loads from
the same cache line to a single load [1].
On a CPU supporting AVX2, the sender can encode up to 256
bits per load (e.g., using the VMOVAPS load).
Receiver. The receiver mounts ZombieLoad to leak the values
loaded by the sender. However, as the receiver leaks the loads only
in the transient domain, the leaked value have to be transferred
into the architectural domain. We encode the leaked values into
the cache and recover them using Flush+Reload. When encoding
values in the cache, we require at least 2 cache lines, i.e., 128 B, per
bit to prevent the adjacent-cache-line prefetcher from interfering
with the encoding. In practice, we require one physical page, i.e.,
4 kB, per possible value to prevent interference of the prefetcher.
To reduce the recover bottleneck, we transfer single bytes from the
transient to the architectural domain which already requires 256
runs of Flush+Reload.
0xFF SEQ DATA DATA
071523
Figure 5:The packet format used in the covert channel. Every
32-bit packet consists of 8 data bits, 8-bit checksum (two’s
complement), 8-bit sequence number, and a constant prefix.
As a result, our proof-of-concept limits the transmission of actual
data to a single byte per leaked load. However, we can use the
remaining bits in the load to ensure that the channel is free of
errors.
Transient Error Detection. The transmission of the data be-
tween sender and receiver is free of any noise. However, the re-
ceiver does not only recover values from the sender, but also other
loads from the current and sibling logical core. Hence, to get rid of
this noise, we encode the data as shown in Figure 5. This allows
the receiver to filter out data not originating from the sender.
Although we cannot transfer the entire packet into the archi-
tectural domain, we can compute on the packet in the transient
domain. Thus, we run the error detection in the transient domain,
and only transmit valid packets to the architectural domain.
The challenge to run the error detection in the transient domain
is that the number of instructions is limited, and not all instructions
can be used. For reliable results, we cannot use instructions which
speculate on either control or data flow. Hence, the error-detection
code has to be as short as possible and branch free.
Our packet structure allows for extremely efficient error detec-
tion. We encode the data in the first byte and the two’s complement
of the data in the second byte as a checksum. To detect errors, we
XOR the value of the first byte (i.e., the data) onto the second byte
(i.e., the two’s complement of the data). If both values are received
correctly, the XOR ensures that the bits 8 to 15 of the packet are
zero. Thus, for a correct packet, the least-significant 16 bits of the
packet represent a value between 0 and 255, and for a wrong packet,
these bits represent a value which is larger than 255. We use these
resulting 16-bit value as an index into our oracle array, i.e., an array
consisting of 256 pages. Therefore, any value which is not a correct
byte is out of bounds and has thus no effect on the cache state of
the array. A correct byte is also a valid index into the oracle array
and ensures that the first cache line of the corresponding page is
cached. Finally, by applying a cache-based side-channel attack, such
as Flush+Reload, we can recover the byte from the cache state of
the oracle array [42, 45].
The error detection in the transient domain has the advantage
that we do not require computation time in the architectural do-
main. Instead of waiting for the exception to become architecturally
visible by doing nothing, we already use this time to perform the
required computation. An additional advantage is that while we
are still in the transient domain, we can work on noise-free data.
Thus, we do not require complex error correction after receiving
the data [51].
In addition to the error detection, we also encode a sequence
number into the packet. The sequence number allows ordering
the received packets. It can be recovered using the same method
as the data value, e.g., using an oracle array and a cache-based
side-channel attack.
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Results. We evaluate the covert channel both in a lab environ-
ment as well as in a public cloud. In the lab environment, we used
2 virtual machines running inside QEMU KVM on an i7-8650U. For
the cloud scenario2, we used 2 co-located virtual machines running
CentOS 7.6.1810 with a Linux kernel version of 3.10.0-957 on a Xeon
E5-2670 CPU.
Both on the cloud, as well as on our lab machine, we achieved an
error-free transmission. On our lab machine, we observed transmis-
sion rates of up to 26.8 kbit/s. As TSX was not available in the cloud
scenario, we achieved a transmission rate of 1.99 kbit/s (σx¯ = 2.5 %,
n = 1000) with Variant 1 and signal handling.
6.4 Browsing-Behavior Monitoring
ZombieLoad is also well suited for detecting specific byte sequences
within loaded data.We demonstrate an attack for which we leverage
ZombieLoad to fingerprint a web browser session. For this attack,
we assume an unprivileged attacker running on one logical core and
a web browser running on the sibling logical core. In this scenario,
it is irrelevant whether the attacker and victim run on a native
machine or whether they are in (different) virtual machines.
We present two different attacks, a keyword detection attack
which can fingerprint website content, and an URL recovery attack
to monitor a victim’s browsing behavior.
Keyword Detection. The keyword detection allows an attacker
to gain information on the type of content the victim is consuming.
For this attack, we constantly sample data using ZombieLoad and
match leaked values against a list of pre-defined keywords.
We leverage the fact that we have access to a full cache line
and can do arbitrary computations in the transient domain (cf. Sec-
tion 6.3). As a result of the computation, we only have to externalize
a small integer indicating which keyword has matched via a cache
side channel.
One limitation is the length of the keyword list, as in the transient
domain, only a limited number of memory accesses are possible
before the transient execution aborts. The most reliable solution is
to store the keyword list entirely in CPU registers. Hence, the length
of the keyword list is limited by the available registers. Moreover,
the length is also limited by the amount of code that is transiently
executed to compare leaked values to the keyword list.
URL Recovery. In the second attack, we recover accessed web-
sites from browser sessions without prior selection of interesting
keywords. We take a more indirect approach that relies on modern
websites performing many individual HTTP requests to the same
domain, e.g., to load additional resources such as scripts and images.
In the transient domain, we again sample data using ZombieLoad.
While still in the transient domain, we detect the substring “www.”
inside the leaked data. When we discover a match, we leak the
character following “www.” to the architectural domain using a
cache side channel. This already results in a set of first characters
of domain names which we refer to as the candidate set.
In the next iteration, for every domain in the candidate set, we
take the last four leaked characters (e.g., “ww.X”). We use this string
in the transient domain to filter leaked values, similar to the “www.”
substring in the first iteration. If a match is found, we leak the next
2The cloud provider asked us not to disclose its name at this point.
Table 3: Number of accesses required to recover a website
name. The experiment was repeated 100 times per website.
Website Minimal Average Maximum
nytimes.com 1 1 3
facebook.com 1 2 4
kernel.org 2 6 13
gnupg.org 2 10 34
1 if (x < array_len) {
2 y = array[x];
3 }
Listing 1: A simple prefetch gadget relying on Spectre-
PHT [42]. By mistraining the branch, this gadget loads an
arbitrary out-of-bounds value for targeted leakage.
character. We can repeat these steps until we see a string ending
with a top-level domain.
Note that this attack is not limited to URLs. Potentially all data
which follows a predictable pattern, such as session cookies or
credit-card numbers, can be leaked with this variant.
Results. We evaluated both attacks running an unmodified Fire-
fox browser version 66.0.2 on the same physical core as the attacker.
Our proof-of-concept implementation of the keyword-checking
attack can check four up to 8-byte long keywords. Due to excessive
precomputations of browsers when entering an URL, a keyword is
sometimes already matched during the autocompletion of the URL.
For highly dynamic websites, such as nytimes.com, keywords reli-
ably match on the first access of the website. Accessing mostly static
websites, such as gnupg.org, have a 60 % probability of matching a
keyword in this setup. We observed false positives after the first
website access when continuing to use the browser. We hypothesize
that memory locations containing the keywords get re-used and
may thus leak at a later time again.
For the URL recovery attack, we simulated user behavior by
accessing popular websites and refreshing them in a defined time
interval. We counted the number of refreshes necessary until we
recovered the entire URL including top level domain. For each
website, the experiment was repeated 100 times.
The actual number of refreshes needed depends on the nature
of the website that is visited. If it is a highly dynamic page, such as
facebook.com or nytimes.com, a small number of reloads is sufficient
to recover the entire name. For static pages, such as gnupg.org or
kernel.org, the number of reloads necessary increases by a factor of
10, approximately. See Table 3 for a detailed overview of required
reloads.
6.5 Targeted Data Leakage
Inherently, ZombieLoad is a 1-dimensional side channel, i.e., the
leakage is only controlled by the time. Hence, leakage cannot
be steered using specific addresses as is the case, e.g., for Melt-
down [45]. While this data sampling is still sufficient for several
real-world attacks, it is still a limiting factor for general attacks.
In this section, we show how ZombieLoad can be combined with
prefetch gadgets [9] for targeted data leakage.
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Speculative Data Leakage. Listing 1 illustrates such a gadget.
It is a common pattern in software for accessing an element of an
array [9]. First, the code checks whether the index lies within the
bounds of the array. Only if this is the case, the element is accessed,
i.e., loaded. While it is evident that for a user-controlled index the
corresponding array element can be loaded, such a gadget is even
more powerful.
On a CPU vulnerable to Spectre, an attacker can mistrain the
branch predictor, e.g., by providing several valid values for the array
index. Then, by providing an out-of-bounds index, the branch is
misspeculated and speculatively accesses an out-of-bounds value.
Alternatively, the attacker can alternate between valid and out-of-
bounds indices randomly to achieve a high percentage of mispre-
dictions without any prior branch predictor mistraining.
ZombieLoad cannot only leak architecturally accessed data but
also speculatively accessed data. Hence, ZombieLoad can even see
the value of loads which are never architecturally visible. Such loads
include, among others, speculative memory loads and prefetches.
Thus, any Spectre gadget which is not hardened, e.g., using a mem-
ory fence [4, 5, 9, 33] or a mask [9, 10], can be used to specify data
to leak.
Moreover, ZombieLoad does not require classic Spectre gadgets
containing an indirect array access [42]. A simple out-of-bounds
access (cf. Listing 1) is sufficient. While such gadgets have been
demonstrated for breaking KASLR [62], they were considered as
relatively harmless as they do not leak data [9]. Hence, most ap-
proaches for finding gadgets do not consider such gadgets [26, 73].
In the Linux kernel, however, such gadgets are also patched if they
are discovered, mainly as they can be used together with the Fore-
shadow vulnerability to leak arbitrary kernel memory [12, 66]. So
far, 172 such gadgets have been fixed in kernel 5.0 [9]. With Zom-
bieLoad, we show that such gadgets are indeed powerful and have
to be patched as well.
Potential Incompleteness of Countermeasures. Mainly, there
are 2 methods to prevent exploitation of Spectre-PHT: memory
fences after branches [4, 5, 9, 33], or constraining the index to a
valid range using a bitmask [9, 10]. The variant using fences is im-
plemented in the Microsoft compiler [41, 42], whereas the variant
using bitmasks is implemented in GCC [48] and LLVM [10], and
also used in the Linux kernel [48].
Both methods prevent exploitation of Spectre-PHT [9], as the
misspeculation cannot load any data. Hence, this is also effective
against ZombieLoad, as fixed gadgets cannot be exploited to load
arbitrary values.
However, even with these countermeasures in place, there is
a remaining leakage which can be exploited using ZombieLoad.
When architecturally loading an in-bounds value, ZombieLoad can
leak up to 64 bytes of the load. Hence, with ZombieLoad, there is a
potential leakage of up to 63 bytes which are out of bounds if the
last in-bounds value is at the beginning of a cache line or the base
of the array is at the end of a cache line.
Data Leakage. To demonstrate the feasibility of prefetch gad-
gets for targeted data leakage, we leverage an artificial prefetch
gadget as given in Listing 1. For our evaluation, we used such a
gadget in the system-call path of the Linux kernel 5.0.7. We execute
ZombieLoad on one logical core and on the other we execute sys-
tem calls that switch between out-of-bounds and in-bounds array
indices to achieve a high frequency of mispredictions in the gadget.
This approach yields leaked values with a large noise compo-
nent from unrelated loads. We repeat this setup without trying to
generate mispredictions to generate a baseline of noise values. We
generate frequency distributions for both runs and subtract the
noise frequency from the misprediction run. We then choose the
byte value that was seen most frequently.
With this crude statistical method, we can recover kernel mem-
ory at one byte per 10 s with 38 % accuracy. Probing bytes for 20 s
improves the accuracy to 46 %.
As with Meltdown [45], common byte values such as 0x00 and
0xFF occur too often and have to be removed from the leaked data
for the recovery to work. Our approach is thus blind to these values.
The speed and accuracy can be improved if there is a priori
knowledge of the target data. For example, a 7-bit ASCII string can
be leaked with a probing time of 10 s per byte with 72 % accuracy.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
As ZombieLoad leaks loaded values across logical cores, a straight-
forward mitigation is disabling the use of hyperthreading. Hyper-
threading improves performance for certain workloads by 30 % to
40 % [8, 52], and as such disabling it may incur an unacceptable
performance impact.
Co-Scheduling. Depending on the workload, a more efficient
mitigation is the use of co-scheduling [55]. Co-scheduling can be
configured to prevent the execution of code from different pro-
tection domains on a hyperthread pair. Current topology-aware
co-scheduling algorithms [64] are not concerned with preventing
kernel code from running concurrently with user-space code. With
such a scheduling strategy, leaks between user processes can be pre-
vented but leaks between kernel and user space cannot. To prevent
leakage between kernel and user space, the kernel must addition-
ally ensure that kernel entries on one logical core force the sibling
logical core into the kernel as well. This discussion applies in an
analogous way to hypervisors and virtual machines.
Flushing Buffers. We have demonstrated that ZombieLoad
also works across protection boundaries on a single logical core.
Hence, disabling hyperthreading or co-scheduling are not fully ef-
fective as mitigation. We have not found an instruction sequence
that reliably prevents leakage across protection boundaries. Even
flushing the entire L1 data cache (using MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD) and
issuing as many dummy loads as there are fill-buffer entries (“load
stuffing”) is not sufficient. There is still remaining leakage, which
we assume is caused by the replacement policy of the line-fill buffer.
Hence, to fully mitigate the leakage, we require a microcode update
which provides a method to flush the line-fill buffer.
Selective Feature Deactivation. Weaker countermeasures tar-
get individual building blocks (cf. Section 5). The operating system
kernel can make sure always to set the accessed and dirty bits in
page tables to impair Variant 2. Unfortunately, Variant 1 is always
possible, if the attacker can identify an alias mapping of any acces-
sible user page in the kernel. This is especially true if the attacker
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is running in or can create a virtual machine. Hence, we also rec-
ommend disabling VT-x on systems that do not need to run virtual
machines.
Removing Prefetch Gadgets. To prevent targeted data leakage,
prefetch gadgets need to be neutralized, e.g., using array_index_nospec
in the Linux kernel. This function clamps array indices into valid
values and prevents arbitrary virtual memory to be prefetched.
Placing these functions is currently a manual task and due to the
incomplete documentation of how Intel CPUs prefetch data, these
mitigations cannot be complete. Note that Spectre mitigations using
lfence instructions might also be incomplete against ZombieLoad.
Another way to prevent prefetch gadgets from reaching sensitive
data is to prevent this data from being mapped in the address
space of the prefetch gadget. Exclusive Page-Frame Ownership [39]
(XPFO) partially achieves this for the Linux kernel’s mapping of
physical memory.
Prefetch gadgets can also be neutralized using Speculative Load
Hardening [10] (SLH). SLH prevents speculative execution by intro-
ducing artificial data dependencies via a compiler pass. SLH incurs
a performance overhead of 10 % to 50 % for typical applications. To
the best of our knowledge, its overhead for kernel or hypervisor
code has not been studied yet.
Instruction Filtering. The above discussion mostly focusses
on attacks across process or virtual-machine boundaries. For attacks
inside of a single process (e.g., JavaScript sandbox), the sandbox
implementationmustmake sure that the requirements formounting
ZombieLoad are not met. One example is to prevent the generation
and execution of the clflush instructions, which so far is a crucial
part of the attack.
Secret Sharing. On the software side, we can also rely on secret
sharing techniques used to protect against physical side-channel
attacks [65]. We can ensure that a secret is never directly loaded
from memory but instead only combined in registers before being
used. As a consequence, observing the data of a load does not reveal
the secret. For a successful attack, an attacker has to leak all shares
of the secret. This mitigation is, of course, incomplete if register
values are written to and subsequently loaded from memory as part
of context switching.
8 CONCLUSION
With ZombieLoad, we showed a novel Meltdown-type attack target-
ing the processor’s fill-buffer logic. ZombieLoad enables an attacker
to leak recently loaded values used by the current or sibling logical
CPU. We show that ZombieLoad allows leaking across user-space
processes, CPU protection rings, virtual machines, and SGX en-
claves. We demonstrated the immense attack potential by monitor-
ing browser behaviour, extracting AES keys, establishing cross-VM
covert channels or recovering SGX sealing keys. Finally, we con-
clude that disabling hyperthreading is the only possible workaround
to mitigate ZombieLoad on current processors.
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A FILL-BUFFER SIZE
In this section, we analyze the size of the fill buffer in terms of fill-
buffer entries usable per logical core. Intel describes the fill buffer as
a “competitively-shared resource during HT operation” [31]. Hence,
with 10 fill-buffer entries (Sandy Bridge and newer microarchitec-
tures) [31], we expect that when hyperthreading is enabled, every
logical core can use up to 10 entries.
Our experimental setup measures the time it takes to execute n
stores to DRAM, forn = 1, . . . , 20. We expect that the time increases
linearly with the number of stores n as long as there are unused
fill-buffer entries. To ensure that the stores occupy the fill buffer, we
leverage non-temporal stores which bypass the cache and directly
go to DRAM. We repeated our experiments 1 000 000 times, and we
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Figure 6: One logical core can leverage the entire fill buffer
(12 entries). If both logical cores execute stores, the fill buffer
is competitively shared, leading to an increased latency for
both logical cores.
6 8 10 12 14
300
400
500
FB exhaust
(12 entries)
Latency increase
(10 entries)
Latency increase
(12 entries)
Non-temporal Stores
La
te
nc
y
[c
yc
le
s]
Haswell
Skylake
Figure 7: One pre-Skylake, we measure 10 fill-buffer entries,
matching Intel’s documentation. On Skylake and newer, we
measure 12 fill-buffer entries.
always measured the best case, i.e., the minimum latency, to get rid
of any noise.
Figure 6 shows that both logical cores can indeed leverage the
entire fill buffer. When running the experiment on one (isolated)
logical core, while the other (isolated) logical core does nothing, we
get a latency increase when executing more than 12 stores. When
we run the experiment on both logical cores in parallel, the latency
increase is still after 12 stores.
Interestingly, the documented number of fill buffers does not
match our experiments for Skylake and newer microarchitectures.
While we measure 10 entries on pre-Skylake CPUs as it is docu-
mented, we measure 12 entries on Skylake and newer (cf. Figure 7).
From our experiments we conclude that both logical cores can
leverage the entire fill buffer Therefore, every logical core can
potentially use any entry in the fill buffer.
